The Impact of Dark and Visible Fragmentation on Market Quality (Replaces CentER Discussion Paper 2011-051) by Degryse, H.A. et al.
 
 
THE IMPACT OF DARK AND VISIBLE 
FRAGMENTATION ON MARKET QUALITY 
 
 







European Banking Center Discussion Paper 
No. 2011-016 
 






This is a revised version of: 











ISSN 0924-7815 The impact of dark and visible fragmentation on
market quality
Hans Degryse￿ Frank de Jong Vincent van Kervel
June 2011
Abstract
Two important characteristics of current European equity markets are rooted in
changes in ￿nancial regulation (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive). The
regulation (i) allows new trading venues to emerge, generating a fragmented market
place and (ii) allows for a substantial fraction of trading to take place in the dark, out-
side publicly displayed order books. This paper evaluates the impact on liquidity of
fragmentation in visible order books and dark trading for a sample of 52 Dutch stocks.
We consider global liquidity by consolidating the entire limit order books of all visi-
ble European trading venues, and local liquidity by considering the traditional market
only. We ￿nd that fragmentation in visible order books improves global liquidity, but
dark trading has a detrimental effect. In addition, local liquidity is lowered by frag-
mentation in visible order books.
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11 Introduction
Following the developments in the US, European equity markets have seen a proliferation
of new trading venues. While traditional stock exchanges had a near monopoly on trading
until the end of 2007, recent changes in ￿nancial regulation, in particular the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), allow new trading venues to compete for order
￿ow. Consequently, trading has become dispersed over many trading venues, creating a
fragmented market place. In addition to increased fragmentation of trading in visible order
books (for short fragmentation), another important feature of current equity markets is that
a substantial fraction oftotal traded volume is executed dark, e.g. Over The Counter(OTC),
at Broker-Dealer Crossing Networks or in dark pools.1 Both the impact of fragmentation
and the role of dark trading in equity markets have since long interested researchers, regula-
tors, investors and trading institutions. In this paper, we add to the literature by estimating
the effects of both fragmentation and dark trading on liquidity. In addition, we improve
upon previous research by employing a dataset that covers the relevant universe of trad-
ing platforms, provides stronger identi￿cation of fragmentation and allows for improved
liquidity metrics.
In Europe, market fragmentation and the substantial share of dark trading are conse-
quences of the implementation of MiFID in November 2007. MiFID’s main goal is to
improve market quality through two channels; by imposing rules on the degree of trans-
parency for different types of trading venues and by allowing for competition between
trading venues. First, in order to create a fair level playing ￿eld, most trading venues
have to comply with similar transparency requirements. In particular, trading venues are
requested to report continuously on the quotes they offer (pre-trade transparency) and on
executed transactions (post-trade transparency). However, exceptions to pre-trade trans-
parency rules are granted to certain types of transactions and trading venues, which makes
these dark. Previous research suggests that enhanced pre-trade transparency rules allow for
faster and cheaper access to information, hence improving ef￿ciency (e.g. Biais, BisiŁre,
and Spatt (2010), Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005)). Second, different types of trading venues
are allowed to compete for order ￿ow with the traditional market. Competition is expected
to reduce the monopoly power of the traditional market, to lower transaction costs (Biais,
Martimort, and Rochet, 2000) and to foster technological innovation (Stoll, 2003). How-
1Gomber and Pierron (2010) report a dark trading fraction of 40%, but these numbers are debatable
because of data issues, such as double reporting and missing or double corrections.
2ever, theory also suggests that fragmentation might reduce liquidity. When order ￿ow
becomes fragmented, the probability of ￿nding a counterparty diminishes. Consequently,
execution probabilities are lowered, which might cause some investors to leave the market
or informed investors to leverage their informational advantage (e.g. Chowdhry and Nanda
(1991)). Moreover, a single, consolidated market may enjoy economies of scale resulting
in lower processing costs.
Inthispaper, weinvestigatetheeffectoffragmentationonmarketliquidityforasample
of European stocks and speci￿cally distinguish between visible and dark trading. Foucault
and Menkveld (2008) study competition between the LSE and Euronext for Dutch stocks
in 2004, and ￿nd that fragmentation over these two traditional stock markets improves
liquidity. O’Hara and Ye (2011) ￿nd that fragmentation resulting from both visible and
dark trading venues lowers transaction costs and increases execution speeds for NYSE and
Nasdaq stocks.
We address the impact of fragmentation on market liquidity by creating for every ￿rm
daily proxies of fragmentation, dark activity and liquidity, employing information from
all relevant trading venues. Speci￿cally, we study 52 Dutch stocks in a period before the
start that fragmentation has set in, January 2006, until the end of 2009. These stocks are
relatively large with an average size twice as high the NYSE and Nasdaq stocks analyzed
in O’Hara and Ye (2011). We measure the degree of fragmentation by the Her￿ndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI, the sum of the squared market shares) based on executed trades
on all visible trading venues. The market share of traded volume on dark venues and OTC
represents dark activity.2 Then, for each stock we construct a consolidated limit order
book (i.e., the limit order books of all visible trading venues combined) to get a complete
picture of the global liquidity available in the market. Based on the consolidated order
book we analyze liquidity at the best price levels, but also deeper in the order book. This
is important, as the depth of the order book re￿ects the quantity immediately available for
trading and accordingly the price of immediacy. Next to global liquidity, available to an
investor using Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT), we also address the impact of
fragmentation on local liquidity, available to investors that tap the traditional market only.
Our panel dataset helps to identify an exogenous relation between liquidity and frag-
mentation by means of ￿rm*quarter ￿xed effects and instrumental variables regressions.
2We treat executions of hidden and ‘iceberg’ orders as visible, since these trades take place on predomi-
nantly visible trading venues.
3The ￿rm*quarter dummies only allow for variation in fragmentation and liquidity within
a ￿rm-quarter, making the analysis robust to various industry speci￿c shocks and time-
varying ￿rm speci￿c shocks. As instruments of fragmentation we use (i) the number of
limit orders to market orders on the new competing venues, and (ii) the average order size
on the new competing venues, similar to O’Hara and Ye (2011). Dark trading is instru-
mented by the average dark order size.
Our main ￿nding is that the effect of fragmentation on global liquidity has an inverted
U-shape, while the effect of dark trading is strongly negative. That is, employing our most
conservative estimates, the optimal degree of fragmentation improves global liquidity with
approximately 32% compared with a completely concentrated market, while an increase
in dark trading of one standard deviation lowers global liquidity by 9%. This result is a
re￿nementtothemoregeneralconclusionofO’HaraandYe(2011)thatfragmentationdoes
not harm market quality. In line with our results, Weaver (2011) shows that off exchange
reported trades, which mostly represent dark trades in his sample, negatively affect market
quality for US stocks. Contradictory to our results, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a) ￿nd
that dark pool activity is positively related to liquidity. Their data contains voluntarily
reported trading volumes by 11 out of 32 active dark pools, while our dark measure also
contains internalised trades and trades on crossing networks. Taken together, these ￿ndings
con￿rm the relevance of distinguising between different types of trading systems when
evaluating market quality.
In addition, the gains of fragmentation mainly hold for liquidity close to the midpoint,
i.e. at relatively good price levels, but to a much lesser extent for liquidity deeper in the
order book, which improves by only 12%. This result suggests that new entrants primarily
improve liquidity close to the midpoint, but do not provide much liquidity deeper in the
order book. Visible liquidity is lowered by dark activity, which might be explained by a
"cream-skimming" effect between those markets. Since informed investor typically trade at
the same side of the order book, they face low execution probabilities in crossing networks
and dark pools. Consequently, dark markets attract predominantly uninformed traders,
leaving the informed trades to visible markets (Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000, Zhu,
2011).
While global liquidity bene￿ts from fragmentation, the traditional stock exchange is
worse off as local liquidity close to the midpoint reduces by approximately 10%. This
contrasts the empirical results of Weston (2002) and Foucault and Menkveld (2008), who
4￿nd that fragmentation induced by new competitors improves liquidity of the traditional
stock market (ECNs on Nasdaq and the LSE on Euronext, respectively). As a ￿nal result,
competition between trading venues is ￿ercer for large stocks then for small stocks, as large
stocks are more fragmented and bene￿t twice as much from fragmentation. In addition,
only small stocks experience the negative effect of fragmentation on local liquidity.
In sum, these results suggest that local traders who only trade at the traditional stock
market, i.e. do not use Smart Order Routing Technology, can be worse off in a fragmented
market, especially for relatively small orders. This conclusion adds to the policy debate on
the bene￿ts and drawbacks of stock market fragmentation, where fragmentation appears
to have a bene￿cial effect on total market quality, but is not equally enjoyed by all stock
market participants.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the European
￿nancial market after the introduction of MiFID and Section 3 discusses related literature.
The dataset and liquidity measures are described in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 explains
the methodology and basic results, while section 7 reports a series of robustness checks.
Finally, section 8 reports the conclusions.
2 Background on European ￿nancial markets after Mi-
FID
This section gives a brief discussion on the contents of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID), effective November 1, 2007. By implementing a single legislation for
the European Economic Area, MiFID aims to create a level playing ￿eld for trading venues
and investors, which would ultimately improve market quality. The regulation entails three
major changes to achieve this goal.
First, competition between trading venues is introduced by abolishing the ￿concentra-
tion rule￿3 and allowing three types of trading systems to compete for order ￿ow. These
are regulated markets (RMs), Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and Systematic Inter-
nalisers (SIs). RMs are the traditional exchanges, matching buyers and sellers through an
3The ￿concentration rule￿, adopted by some EU members, obliges transactions to be executed at the
primary market as opposed to internal settlement. This creates a single and fair market on which all investors
post their trades, according to a time and price priority. The repeal of the rule however allows markets to
become fragmented and increases competition between trading venues (Ferrarini and Recine, 2006).
5order book or through dealers. A ￿rm chooses on which RM to list, and once listed, MTFs
may decide to organize trading in that ￿rm as well. MTFs, who closely resemble ECNs in
the US, are similar to RMs in matching third party investors, but have different regulatory
requirements and ‘rules of the game’. For example, MTFs and RMs can decide upon the
type of orders that can be placed, and the structure of fees, i.e. ￿xed fees, variable fees
as well as make or take fees.4 In order to survive, MTFs need to obtain a suf￿cient level
of liquidity from order ￿ow of their owners and outside investors. The largest MTFs with
visible liquidity are Chi-X, Bats Europe, Nasdaq OMX and Turquoise. Lastly, SIs are or-
ganized by investment banks where customers trade against the inventory of the SI or with
other clients, resembling market dealers.
MiFIDs second keystone refers to transparency which guarantees the ￿ow of informa-
tion in the market. As the number of trading venues increases, information about available
prices and quantities in the order books becomes dispersed. Consequently, for investors
to decide on the optimal venue and to evaluate order execution, a suf￿cient degree of pre-
trade and post-trade transparency is necessary. Pre-trade transparency rules require trading
venues to make (part of) their order books public and to continuously update this informa-
tion. However, a number of waivers exist regarding pre-trade transparency. In particular,
there is the ￿large-in-scale orders waiver￿, the ￿reference price waiver￿, the ￿negotiated-
trade waiver￿, and the ￿order management facility waiver￿.5 These waivers are used by
MTFs such as dark pools and broker-dealer crossing networks who only have to report ex-
ecuted trades. Whether transparency has improved is a topic of current debate, which is
complicated by increasingly fragmented markets, technological innovations and shortcom-
ings in the quality of post-trade information.6
The third and ￿nal pillar of MiFID is the introduction of the best-execution rule, which
obliges investment ￿rms to execute orders against the best available conditions with respect
to price, liquidity, transaction costs and likelihood and speed of execution (Aubry and Mc-
Kee, 2007). However, such a broad de￿nition of best-execution policy allows investment
￿rms to decide themselves where to route their orders to. For example, an investment ￿rm
may stipulate an execution policy of trading on one market only. In absence of a clear
benchmark, it becomes dif￿cult for investors to evaluate the quality of executed trades and
the overall performance of an investment ￿rm (Gomber and Gsell, 2006). This is the main
4Make and take fees are costs charged to investors supplying and removing liquidity, respectively. Make
fees can be negative, such that providers of liquidity receive a rebate for offering liquidity.
5See also Directive 2004/39/EC, article 29.
6CESR proposes changes to MiFID, July 29, 2010, ref. 10-926.
6difference between MiFID and its US counterpart, Reg NMS, which solely focusses on the
price dimension.7 For an extensive summary of the implementation process of MiFID we
refer the interested reader to Ferrarini and Recine (2006).
3 Literature on fragmentation and market quality
There is a trade-off between order ￿ow fragmentation and competition. A single market
bene￿ts from lower costs, compared with a fragmented market. These consist of the ￿xed
costs to set up a new trading venue; ￿xed costs for clearing and settlement; costs of mon-
itoring several trading venues simultaneously; and advanced technological infrastructure
to aggregate dispersed information in the market and connect to several trading venues.
Also, a single market that is already liquid will attract even more liquidity due to posi-
tive network externalities (e.g. Pagano (1989a), Pagano (1989b) and Admati, Amihud, and
P￿eiderer (1991)). Each additional trader reduces the stock’s execution risk for other po-
tential traders, attracting more traders. This positive feedback should cause all trades to be
executed at a single market, obtaining the highest degree of liquidity.
However, while network externalities are still relevant, nowadays they may be realized
even when several trading venues coexist. This happens to the extent that the technolog-
ical infrastructure seamlessly links the individual trading venues, creating effectively one
market. From a broker’s point of view, the market is then virtually not fragmented, which
alleviates the drawbacks of fragmentation (Stoll, 2006).8 In addition, fragmentation might
also enhance market quality, as increased competition among liquidity suppliers forces
them to improve their prices, narrowing the bid-ask spreads (e.g. Biais, Martimort, and
Rochet (2000) and Battalio (1997)). Con￿rming a competition effect, Conrad, Johnson,
and Wahal (2003) ￿nd that Alternative Trading Systems in general have lower execution
costs compared with brokers on traditional exchanges. Furthermore, Biais, BisiŁre, and
Spatt (2010) investigate the competition induced by ECN activity on Nasdaq stocks. They
￿nd that ECNs with smaller tick sizes tend to undercut the Nasdaq quotes and reduce over-
all quoted spreads.
Differences between trading venues may arise to cater to the needs of heterogeneous
7In the U.S., the price of every trade is reported to the consolidated tape, such that the performance of a
broker can clearly be evaluated.
8Con￿rming a high level of market integration, Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011) ￿nd that at least two
venues offer the EBBO in 85% of the time for FTSE100 stocks in April/May 2010.
7clientele, as investors differ in their preferences for trading speed, order sizes, anonymity
and likelihood of execution (Harris (1993) and Petrella (2009)). In the US, Boehmer (2005)
stressesthetrade-offbetweenspeedofexecutionandexecutioncostsonNasdaqandNYSE,
where Nasdaq is more expensive but also faster. In order to attract more investors, new trad-
ing venues may apply aggressive pricing schedules, such as make and take fees (Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel, 2009). The fact that some investors prefer a particular trading venue
can also lead to varying degrees of informed trading at each exchange. For instance, the
NYSE has been found to attract more informed order ￿ow than the regional dealers (Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1996) and Nasdaq market makers (Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)
and Af￿eck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994)). Furthermore, Barclay, Hendershott, and
McCormick (2003) ￿nd that ECNs attract more informed order ￿ow than Nasdaq market
makers, as ECN trades have a larger price impact.
Stoll (2003) argues that competition fosters innovation and ef￿ciency, but priority rules
may not be maintained. Speci￿cally, time priority is often violated in fragmented markets,
and sometimes also price priority.9 Foucault and Menkveld (2008) study the competi-
tion between an order book run by the LSE (EuroSETS) and Euronext Amsterdam for
AEX ￿rms in 2004, and ￿nd a trade-through rate of 73%. They call for a prohibition of
trade-throughs as it discourages liquidity provision. More recently, this has been studied
by Ende, Gomber, and Lutat (2009), who combine the order books of ten trading venues
for Eurostoxx 50 stocks in December 2007 and January 2008. They ￿nd that 6.7% of all
transactions are full trade-throughs and an additional 6.5% are partial trade-throughs. Pos-
sible explanations are high costs of monitoring multiple markets, or high variable and ￿xed
trading fees and clearing and settlement costs.
Next to competition between trading venues with visible liquidity, this paper is related
to competition effects in dark markets, i.e. venues without publicly displayed order books.
A few papers theoretically investigate the impact of dark trading on traditional markets.
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model a crossing network that competes with a dealer
market, and ￿nd ambiguous effects on the dealer’s spread. On the one hand, a crossing
network may attract new liquidity traders and therefore lead to lower dealer spreads. On
the other hand, when the dealer market is used as a market of last resort, the dealer’s
spread may increase. Also modeling the interaction between a crossing network and dealer
9Time priority is violated when two limit orders with the same price are placed on two venues and the
order placed last is executed ￿rst. Price priority is violated, i.e. a trade-through, when an order gets executed
against a price worse than the best quoted price in the market. A partial trade-through means that only part
of the order could have been executed against a better price.
8market, Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts (2009) ￿nd that the order ￿ow dynamics and
welfare implications depend on the degree of transparency but they do not endogenize
the spread. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010b) model the competition between a dark pool
and visible limit order book, and show that the initial level of liquidity determines the
effect of the dark pool on quoted spreads. That is, for liquid stocks both limit and market
orders migrate to the dark pool, leaving the spread very tight, while for illiquid stocks the
competition induced by the dark pool makes limit orders relatively unattractive, causing
the spread to increase. In contrast, Zhu (2011) argues that informed traders have relatively
low execution probabilities in the dark pool since they typically trade on the same side
of the order book. Therefore, informed trading diverts to the traditional market, which
adversely affects liquidity in that market. Empirically, Gresse (2006) ￿nds a positive effect
onliquidityforUKstocksascrossingnetworkvolumeisnegativelyrelatedtodealermarket
spreads.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on algorithmic trading,10 i.e. the use of
computer programs to manage and execute trades in electronic limit order books. Algo-
rithmic trading has strongly increased over time, and has drastically affected the trading
environment (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009). In particular, it affects the level of market
fragmentation analyzed in our sample, as computer programs and Smart Order Routing
Technology (SORT) allow investors to ￿nd the best liquidity in the market by comparing
the order books of individual venues.11 Moreover, algorithmic trading is related to liquidity
as it reduces implicit transaction costs by splitting up large orders into many smaller ones
(Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011). Programs are also used to identify deviations
from the ef￿cient stock price, by quickly trading on new information or price changes of
other securities. Furthermore, programs may provide liquidity when quoted spreads are
large, e.g. when it is pro￿table to do so (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009). Hasbrouck and
Saar (2009) describe ￿￿eeting orders￿, a relatively new phenomenon in Europe and the
US, where limit orders are placed and canceled within two seconds if they are not exe-
cuted. The authors argue that ￿eeting orders are part of an active search for liquidity and a
consequence of improved technology, more hidden liquidity and fragmented markets.
10Algorithmic trading is also know as High Frequency Trading.
11See e.g. Gomber and Gsell (2006) for a discussion on SORT and algorithmic trading in Europe.
94 Market description, dataset and descriptive statistics
4.1 Market description
Our dataset contains 52 Dutch stocks forming the constituents of the AEX Large and Mid
cap indices. Over time, all these stocks are traded on several trading platforms, which is
representative for the large European stocks analyzed by Gomber and Pierron (2010). In
terms of size, the average market cap of our sample is approximately twice as large as the
2754 NYSE and Nasdaq ￿rms analyzed in O’Hara and Ye (2011). In broad terms, we can
summarize the most important trading venues for these stocks into three groups, which we
describe shortly.
First, there are regulated markets (RMs), such as NYSE Euronext, LSE and Deutsche
Boerse. These markets have an opening and closing auction, and in between there is con-
tinuous and anonymous trading through the limit order book. Since Euronext merged with
NYSE in April 2007, the order books in Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon act as a
fully integrated and single market. In our sample, the LSE and Deutsche Boerse are not
very important as they attract less than 1% of total order ￿ow.
Second, there are the new MTFs with visible liquidity, such as Chi-X, Bats Europe,
Nasdaq OMX and Turquoise. Chi-X started trading AEX ￿rms in April 2007; Turquoise
in August 2008 and Nasdaq OMX and Bats Europe in October 2008. Whether these MTFs
will survive depends on the current level of liquidity, but also on the quality of the trading
technology (e.g. the speed of execution), the number of securities traded, make and take
fees and clearing and settlement costs. A new trading venue in Europe typically starts with
a test phase in which only a few liquid ￿rms are traded, but will allow trading in all stocks
of a certain index simultaneously when it goes live.
The third group contains MTFs with completely hidden liquidity (e.g. dark pools), SIs
and the Over The Counter market. Dark pools are waived from the pre-trade transparency
rules set out by the MiFID due to the nature of their business model. Most dark pools
employ a limit order book with similar rules as those at Euronext for example. Other
MTFs act as crossing networks, where trades are executed against the midpoint on the
primary market, and do not contribute to price discovery. Gomber and Pierron (2010)
report that the activity on dark pools, crossing networks and OTC has been fairly constant
forEuropeanequitiesin2008-2009, wheretheyexecuteapproximately40%oftotaltraded
10volume. We refer the interested reader to Davies (2008) for more details of some of the
individual trading venues.
4.2 Dataset
Our dataset covers the AEX Large and Midcap constituents from 2006 to 2009, which
currently have 25 and 23 stocks respectively. An advantage of using both indices is that
we are able to follow stocks that switch between the large and mid cap index. We remove
stocks that are in the sample for less than six months or do not have observations in 2008
and 2009. Due to some leavers and joiners, our ￿nal sample has 52 stocks.
The data for the 52 AEX Large and Midcap constituents stem from the Thomson
Reuters Tick History Data base. This data source covers the seven most relevant Euro-
pean trading venues for the sample stocks, which have executed more than 99% of the
visible order ￿ow: Euronext, Chi-X, Deutsche Boerse, Turquoise, Bats Europe, Nasdaq
OMX and SIX Swiss exchange (formerly known as Virt-X).12 We employ data from all
these venues but collect them only during the trading hours of the continuous auction of
Euronext Amsterdam, i.e. between 09.00 to 17.30, Amsterdam time. Therefore, data of the
opening and closing auctions at these venues are not included.13
Each stock-venue combination is reported in a separate ￿le and represents a single
order book. Every order book contains the ten best quotes at both sides of the market,
i.e. the ten highest bid and lowest ask prices and their associated quantities, summing to
40 variables per observation.14 A new ￿state￿ of a stock-venue limit order book is created
whenalimitorderarrives, getscanceledorwhenatradetakesplace. Atradeisimmediately
reported and we observe its associated price and quantity, as well as an update of the order
book. Price and time priority rules apply within each stock-venue order book, but not
between venues. Furthermore, visible orders have time priority over hidden orders. Hidden
12The order books of the LSE are discarded as those stocks are denoted in pennies instead of Euros;
which in essence are different assets. The remaining trading venues with visible liquidity attract extremely
littleorder￿owforthe￿rmsinoursample(e.g., NYSE,Milanstockexchange, PLUSgroupandsomesmaller
MTFs).
13Unscheduled intra-day auctions are not identi￿ed in our dataset. These auctions, triggered by transac-
tions that would cause extreme price movements, act as a safety measure and typically last for a few minutes.
Given that we will work with daily averages of quote-by-quote liquidity measures, these auctions should not
affect our results.
14Part of the sample only has the best ￿ve price levels: Euronext before January 2008. Only liquidity deep
in the order book is affected. In section 7.4 we execute the analysis separately for 2008 and 2009; the results
are unaffected.
11orders are not directly observed in the dataset but are detected upon execution. Therefore,
we have the same information set as traders have, i.e. the visible part of the order book on
a continuous basis.
Our dataset also provides information on ￿dark trades￿, i.e. trades at dark pools, SIs
and Over The Counter (including trades executed over telephone). These dark trades are
part of the Thomson Reuters dataset and reported by Markit Boat, a MiFID-compliant trade
reporting company. There are known issues with these dark data (e.g. double reporting),
but it should be a good proxy for true dark activity. While we have information regarding
price, quantity and time of execution, we do not observe the identity of the underlying
trading venue. In addition, we also add the OTC and SI trades reported separately in the
MiFID post trade ￿les from Euronext, Xetra, Chi-X and Stockholm.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the daily traded volume, aggregated over all AEX Large
and Mid cap constituents. The graph shows a steady increase in total trading activity,
which peaks around the beginning of 2008. Moreover, the dominance of Euronext over its
challengers is strong, but slowly decreasing over time. This pattern is representative for all
regulated markets trading European blue chip stocks, as analyzed by Gomber and Pierron
(2010). Finally, while Chi-X started trading AEX ￿rms in April 2007, all MTFs together
started to attract signi￿cant order ￿ow only as of August 2008 (4.5%). The slow start up
shows that these venues need time to generate trading activity.
In Table 7 in the Appendix, the characteristics of the different stocks and some de-
scriptive statistics are presented. There is considerable variation in ￿rm size (market capi-
talization), price and trading volume. In the sample, 38 stocks have a market capitalization
exceeding one billion Euro, while the 14 remaining stocks have values above 100 million
Euro. The table also reports realized volatilities, computed by ￿rst dividing the trading
day into 34 ￿fteen-minute periods and then calculating stock returns of each period, based
on the spread midpoint at the beginning and end of that period. The standard deviation of
these stock returns are daily estimates of realized volatility.15 The table also shows the av-
erage market share of Euronext and dark trades, which covers all trades reported by Markit
Boat and OTC from the regulated markets. The market shares are percentages of executed
15The use of realized volatility is well established, see e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens
(2001).
12trades as of November 2007 onwards, the period for which Markit Boat data have become
available in the dataset.16 According to our data, in 2009 37% of the total traded volume is
dark; which can be split up into 38% for AEX large cap ￿rms and 20% for mid cap ￿rms.
5 Liquidity and fragmentation
5.1 The consolidated order book
The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of equity market fragmentation on liquidity.
We follow the approach of Gresse (2010) and distinguish between global traders and local
traders. Global traders employ Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT) to access all
trading venues simultaneously, while for local traders SORT is too expensive because of
￿xed trading charges and costs of adopting this trading technology. This distinction is
empirically justi￿ed as SORT is not used by all investors (e.g. Foucault and Menkveld
(2008) and Ende, Gomber, and Lutat (2009)). In our setting, Euronext Amsterdam is the
local market and the consolidated order book represents the global market.
To construct the consolidated order book, we follow the methodology of Chlistalla
and Lutat (2011) and Foucault and Menkveld (2008), based on snapshots of the limit order
book. A snapshot contains the ten best bid and ask prices and associated quantities, for each
stock-venue combination. Every minute we take snapshots of all venues and ￿sum￿ the
liquidity to obtain a stock’s consolidated order book. Therefore, each stock has 510 daily
observations (8.5 hours times 60 minutes), containing the order books of the individual
trading venues and the consolidated one.
5.2 Depth(X) liquidity measure
Our rich dataset allows to construct a liquidity measure that incorporates the limit orders
beyond the best price levels; which we will refer to as the Depth.X/. The measure ag-
gregates the Euro value of the number of shares offered within a ￿xed interval around the
midpoint. Speci￿cally, the midpoint is the average of the best bid and ask price of the
consolidated order book and the interval is an amount X D f10;20;:::;50g basis points
16The lack of Markit Boat data in 2006 and 2007 does not affect our results, as we execute the analysis
separately for 2008 and 2009 only in section 7.4.
13relative to the midpoint.17 The measure is expressed in Euros and calculated every minute.
Equation 1 shows the calculation for the bid and ask side separately, which are summed
to obtain Depth.X/. This measure is constructed for the global and local order book (i.e.,
Euronext Amsterdam) separately. De￿ne price level j D f1;2;:::; Jg on the pricing grid




















j > M ￿ .1 ￿ X/
￿
; (1b)
Depth .X/ D Depth Bid.X/ C Depth Ask.X/: (1c)
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the depth measure, where liquidity between the
horizontal dashed lines is aggregated to obtain Depth.20/ and Depth.40/. The measure
Depth.X/ is calculated every minute and then averaged over the trading day. This gives a
proxy for a stock’s liquidity on a certain day, where Depth.10/ represents liquidity close to
the midpoint and Depth.50/ also includes liquidity deeper in the order book. Comparing
different price levels X reveals the shape of the order book. For example, if the depth
measure increases rapidly in X, the order book is deep while if it increases only slowly, the
order book is relatively thin.
The Depth.X/ measure is very similar to the Exchange Liquidity Measure, XLM.V/,
which also analyzes liquidity deeper in the order book (used by e.g., Gomber, Schweick-
ert, and Theissen (2004)). More speci￿cally, XLM.V/ ￿xes the quantity V of a potential
trade, i.e. V equals e100.000, and analyzes the impact on price; while Depth.X/ ￿xes
the price, i.e. X equals ten basis points around the midpoint, and analyzes the available
quantity. Although both measures estimate the depth and slope of the order book, our
approach solves two rather technical issues. First, the impact on price cannot be calcu-
lated when a stock’s order book has insuf￿cient liquidity to trade e100.000, such that the
XLM.V/ becomes missing. In contrast, if no additional shares are offered within the range
of X and X C " basis points from the midpoint, then Depth.X/ has a zero increment and
Depth.X/ D Depth.X C "/. Second, XLM.V/ may become negative when the consoli-
dated spread is negative, i.e. when the best ask price of a venue is lower than the best bid
17Foucault and Menkveld (2008) aggregate liquidity from one up to four ticks away from the best quotes.
This approach is not appropriate in our setting, as tick sizes have changed over the course of our sample
period. Furthermore, the tick size as a percentage of the share price is not constant.
14price of another venue.18 While negative transaction costs cannot be interpreted meaning-
fully, the midpoint and Depth.X/ are perfectly identi￿ed and re￿ect the available liquidity
in a meaningful fashion.
Anadvantageof Depth.X/measureoverthetraditionalquoteddepthandspreadisthat
it is not sensitive to small, price improving orders. Such orders are placed by algorithmic
traders, whose activity has increased substantially over time. In addition, the quoted depth
and spread are sensitive to changes in tick sizes.19 The impact of these phenomena on the
quoted spread and depth also hinges on the degree of fragmentation and may therefore vary
over time, which makes comparisons between periods troublesome.
The upper panel of Figure 3 shows a very linear shape of the order book, by plotting
the median of the depth measure against the number of basis points around the midpoint.
In the regression analysis we will work with the logarithm of the depth measures, where
the 10, 50 and 90th percentiles are shown in the lower panel of Figure 3. There appear
to be large differences between ￿rms, as for example, the 90th percentile of Depth.10/ is
e915.000, while the 10th percentile of Depth.50/ is e72.000. This is in line with high
levels of skewness and kurtosis (not reported).
Table 1 contains the medians of the Depth.X/ measure for the global and local order
book on a yearly basis, along with other liquidity measures discussed in the next section.
As expected, the global and local depth measures vary substantially over time. However,
some shocks affect liquidity close to the midpoint more than liquidity deep in the order
book. That is, the ratio of Depth.50/ to Depth.10/ is not constant over time.
5.3 Other liquidity measures
This section compares our Depth.X/ liquidity measure to the more traditional liquidity
measures. These are the price impact, effective and realized spread, based on executed
transactions, and the quoted spread and quoted depth, based on quotes in the local and
global order books. The quoted depth sums the Euro amount of shares offered at the best
bid and ask price, whereas the quoted spread looks at the associated prices. The appendix
(section 9) contains a formal description of the measures.
18Technically, a negative consolidated spread is an arbitrage opportunity, which might not be exploited
because of explicit trading costs for example.
19The effect of the tick size on quoted depth and spread have been subject of analysis in several papers,
e.g. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Huang and Stoll (2001).
15The medians of the liquidity measures are reported in the upper panel of Table 1, based
on daily observations and calculated yearly, for the global and local order book. The table
shows several interesting results.
Depth close to the midpoint has reduced strongly over time, while liquidity deeper
in the order book only marginally. That is, the median of Depth.10/ has decreased by
35% from 2006 to 2009, while Depth.50/ by only 14%. In addition, the yearly standard
deviations of the depth measures have decreased by approximately 50% over the years (not
reported). While in 2006 and 2007 the local and global Depth.X/ are highly similar, in
2009 local Depth.X/ represents only about 50% of global depth.
Strikingly, between 2006 and 2009 the median quoted spread has improved by 9%,
while the quoted depth has worsened by 68%. This result coincides with the decrease of
35% in the Depth.10/ measure, and shows a shortcoming of the quoted depth and spread.
That is, based on the quoted depth and spread alone, one cannot state whether an investor
is better off in 2006 or 2009, as this depends on the traded quantity. For a small investor
mainly the quoted spread matters, while for a larger one the depth dimension becomes
more important. To interpret these numbers, one can argue that a trader who places an
order smaller than the median quoted depth in 2009, e30.000, is very likely to be better
off with on average 10% (an argument similarly to that made in Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2011)).
Turning to the liquidity measures based on executed trades, we observe that the median
realized spread has reduced from 2.5 basis points in 2006 to 0 basis points in 2009. In this
period, the price impact went up with 2.9 basis points while the effective spread reduced
with 0.9 basis points. Because we show medians, the price impact and realized spread do
not exactly add up to the effective spread.
Despite the reduction in Depth.X/, the local price impact, realized and effective
spreads are almost identical to those of the global order book. This ￿nding might be in
line with ￿market tipping￿, where the local market switches between periods of relatively
high liquidity, in which it attracts all trading, and periods of low liquidity, in which trading
takes place at competing trading venues. As the price impact, effective and realized spread
are based on trades, relatively liquid periods receive a larger weight in the calculation.
165.4 Equity market fragmentation
To proxy for the level of fragmentation in each stock, we construct a daily Her￿ndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the number of shares traded on each visible trad-
ing venue, similar to Bennett and Wei (2006) and Weston (2002). Formally, HHIit D
PN
vD1 MS2
v;it, or the squared market share of venue v, summed over all N venues for ￿rm
i on day t. We then use Frag D 1 ￿ HHI, such that a single dominant market has zero
fragmentation whereas Frag goes to one in case of complete fragmentation. In addition,
Dark is our proxy for dark trading, calculated as the percentage of volume executed at
dark pools, crossing networks, SIs and Over The Counter. We use the percentage of dark
volume, as we do not know the actual degree of dark fragmentation among dark venues.
However, separating visible competition and dark trading is important, as they may affect
liquidity in a different fashion. Our measure of fragmentation is more accurate than that of
O’Hara and Ye (2011), where the origin of trades are classi￿ed as either Nasdaq, NYSE or
external. The main bene￿ts of competition in their paper arise from the external venues,
but the actual level of fragmentation, and whether they are dark or lit, is unclear.
Table 2 shows the yearly mean, quartiles and standard deviation of Frag and Dark,
based on the sample ￿rms. In 2009, the sample average Frag is 0.28, which is in line
with other European stocks analysed by Gomber and Pierron (2010). The US is more
fragmented, as Nasdaq and NYSE combined have approximately 65% of market share in
2008 (O’Hara and Ye, 2011). As expected, fragmentation increases over time, as in 2006
and 2007 only few sample ￿rms where traded on Virt-X and Deutsche Boerse. Dark is
fairly constant over time (see also Gomber and Pierron (2010)) with on average 25% in
2009, but has a very high daily standard deviation of 17%.20
Figure 4 shows the 10, 50 and 90th percentile of Frag over time, calculated on a
monthly basis and covering all ￿rms. The sharp increase in fragmentation refers to the
periodwhereChi-XandTurquoisestartedtoattractsubstantialorder￿ow, September2008.
In the next section, we estimate the effect of fragmentation on various liquidity measures
in a regression framework.
20The dark share is calculated daily, and then averaged over all days and ￿rms. When weighted by trading




This section ￿rst explains the methodology, and then presents the regression results of the
base model, for the global and local order book.
6.1 Methodology
We employ multivariate panel regression analysis to study the impact of fragmentation and
dark trading on liquidity. We have a panel data set with 52 ￿rms and 1022 days, from 2006
to 2009, which contains the liquidity and fragmentation measures discussed in section 5.
The panel approach allows for more ￿exibility compared to other papers investigating
the impact of fragmentation on liquidity. For example, in contrast to the cross sectional
regressions employed by O’Hara and Ye (2011), we can add ￿rm ￿xed effects to absorb
unobservable ￿rm characteristics, and also measure the time series variation in liquidity
and fragmentation. By using a fragmentation measure based on the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman
Index we improve on papers such as Foucault and Menkveld (2008), Chlistalla and Lutat
(2011) and Hengelbrock and Theissen (2010), who study the introduction of a new trading
venue (EuroSETS, Chi-X and Turquoise respectively). That is, these articles use a dummy
variable that equals one after the introduction of the new venue, to estimate the effect of
fragmentation on liquidity. Given the research question we are after, our approach has three
advantages compared with the aforementioned papers. First, instead of a single trading
venue we can analyze the effect of fragmentation on liquidity over many trading venues
simultaneously. Second, we allow for cross sectional variation in fragmentation as some
￿rms are more heavily traded on new venues than others. And third, we allow for variation
in the time series and analyze a long time window. This procedure takes into account that
new trading venues might need time to grow, and allows the market as a whole to adjust to
a new trading equilibrium.
In the regressions we include volatility, price, ￿rm size and volume as control variables,
which is common in this literature. Descriptives of these control variables are presented in
Table 1.21 In addition, we include a proxy for algorithmic activity, as this has been found to
21Weston (2000), Fink, Fink, and Weston (2006) and O’Hara and Ye (2011), among others, use similar
controls.
18improve liquidity (e.g. Hendershott and Riordan (2009)). We construct a measure similar
to Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011). On average, algorithmic traders place and
cancel many limit orders, so the daily number of electronic messages proxies for their
activity, i.e. placement and cancelations of limit orders and market orders. This variable is
divided by trading volume, as increasing volumes lead to more electronic messages even
in the absence of algorithmic trading. Accordingly, Algoit is de￿ned as the number of
electronic messages divided by trading volume for ￿rm i on day t.
The dependent variable in these regressions is one of the liquidity measures, and the
independent variables are the level of fragmentation and dark trading, and several control
variables. Astheeffectoffragmentationonliquiditymightnotbelinear, weaddaquadratic
term. We employ Fragit D 1 ￿ HHIit and Frag2
it to measure fragmentation, where
Fragit D 0 if trading in a ￿rm is completely concentrated. In our base speci￿cation, ￿rm
￿xed effects and quarter dummies are included.22 The regression equation thus becomes
Liq Measureit D ￿i C ￿q.t/ C ￿1Fragit C ￿2Frag2
it C ￿3Darkit C
￿4Ln.Volatility/it C ￿5Ln.Price/it C ￿6Ln.Size/it C (2)
￿7Ln.Volume/it C ￿8Algoit C "it;
where ￿i are ￿rm dummies and ￿q.t/ are time dummies that take the value 1 if day t is in
quarter q, and are zero otherwise. For the inference we use heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation robust standard errors (Newey-West for panel datasets), based on ￿ve lags.
6.2 Results: global liquidity
The regression results for the liquidity measures employing the global (consolidated) order
book are reported in Table 3. The results of models (1) to (5) show that the linear term
Frag has a positive coef￿cient and the quadratic term Frag2 a negative one. The results
are easier to interpret from Figure 5, which displays the implied results of the effect of
fragmentation on liquidity for the ￿ve models. Liquidity ￿rst strongly increases with frag-
mentation and then decreases. The ￿gure clearly reveals an optimal level of fragmentation,
where maximum liquidity is obtained at Frag D 0:35. This level of fragmentation is fairly
close to the actual level observed in 2009, where Frag is around 0:30. The pattern is highly
similar for all depth levels, although liquidity levels close to the midpoint bene￿t somewhat
22The results are almost identical when using day or month dummies instead of quarter dummies.
19more from fragmentation. The economic magnitudes of the variables are large, where the
maximum effect onln.Depth.10// is 0:50, meaning that observations here have 65% more
liquidity than observations in a completely concentrated market. For Depth.50/, liquid-
ity improves with 50% at the maximum compared with Frag D 0. Table 2 reports that
the standard deviation of fragmentation is 0:15 in the entire sample, so that variation in
fragmentation has a large impact on liquidity throughout the entire order book.
We now investigate the impact of fragmentation on the other liquidity indicators, as
reported in models (6) to (10) in Table 3. At the optimal degree of fragmentation, Frag D
0:35, the price impact and the effective spread reduce by 6:4 and 6:8 basis points com-
pared with a completely concentrated market. This is large, considering that the median
effective spread in 2009 is 13:3 basis points. The economic impact of the optimal degree
of fragmentation on the effective spread in our analysis is larger than estimated in O’Hara
and Ye (2011), where the bene￿t is approximately three basis points for NYSE and Nasdaq
￿rms.23 This difference can partly be explained by our inclusion of a separate dark trading
variable, which has a positive effect on the effective spread and price impact. The effect of
fragmentation on the realized spread is much smaller however, with a reduction of only 0:5
basis points at the optimal level.
The quoted spread in model (9) is minimized at Frag D 0:37 and is eight basis points
lower compared with a completely concentrated market. In stark contrast, the results in
model(10)showthatquoteddepth(atthebestbidandaskquote)reduceby27%at Frag D
0:37. The results on the quoted depth point in the opposite direction of those of all other
liquidity measures. Moreover, considering the low correlation between the quoted depth
and Depth.X/inTable1, itappearsthatthequoteddepthisnotasuitableliquiditymeasure
in the period we study. Possibly, this is a consequence of algorithmic traders who place
many small and price improving orders.
We now turn to the effects of dark trading on liquidity. In Table 3, the coef￿cients on
Dark are strongly negative, with a coef￿cient of ￿0:91 for Depth.10/. As a result, a one
standard deviation (0:18) increase in the fraction of dark trading reduces Depth.10/ by
16%. In addition, the coef￿cient on the price impact of 4:1 suggests that dark trading leads
to more adverse selection and informed trading on the visible markets. Both ￿ndings are
predicted by the theoretical work of Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Zhu (2011),
23O’Hara and Ye (2011) ￿nd a linear coef￿cient on ￿market share outside the primary markets￿ of 9 basis
points, while the average level is 0.35, resulting in a bene￿t of approximately 3 basis points.
20where dark markets are more attractive to uninformed traders, leaving the informed traders
to the visible markets. The intuition is that informed traders typically trade at the same
side of the order book, and therefore face relatively low execution probabilities in the dark
pool or crossing network. As a result, the dark market ￿cream-skims￿ uninformed order
￿ow, worsening liquidity and adverse selection costs in the visible market. In addition, our
results are consistent with Weaver (2011), who shows that off exchange reported trades,
which mostly qualify as dark trades, negatively affect market quality for US stocks. Our
results are in contrast to Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a), who ￿nd that dark pool activity
is positively related to liquidity. A likely explanation is that our Dark measure not only
contains dark pool trades, but also trades from crossing networks and internalised trades.
That is, the impact on liquidity depends on the type of exchange. In addition, Weaver
(2011) cleverly points out that even within the set dark pools the impact on market quality
may vary, depending on whether the purpose of the dark pool is to facilitate block trades or
to internalize order ￿ow. Since the data used by Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2010a) contain
voluntarily reported trading volumes of 11 out of 32 active dark pools, their sample might
not represent all types of dark pools.
However, there might be an endogeneity issue, as low levels of visible liquidity may
induce an investor to trade in the dark as they are substitutes. Alternatively, both markets
can be considered complements, since a liquid OTC market forces limit order suppliers in
the visible market to improve prices as well, and vice versa (e.g., Duf￿e, Garleanu, and
Pedersen (2005)). We tackle such reverse causality issues with an instrumental variables
regression in section 7.2, but our main results are robust.
Turningtothecontrolvariablesoftheregressions, we￿ndthattheeconomicmagnitude
of Algo is fairly small and negative. For example, a one standard deviation increase (s D
0:36), lowers the Depth.X/ measures with 4%. However, as Algo might be indirectly
related to fragmentation, we want to be careful in interpreting this result. The remaining
control variables in the regressions have the expected signs. Larger ￿rms tend to be more
liquid, while the effect of price is marginally positive and economically small. As expected,
increased trading volumes are related to better liquidity, but the causality might go either
way. Finally, volatility has a negative impact on liquidity; especially for liquidity close
to the midpoint. Not surprisingly, the price impact strongly increases in volatility, which
proxies for the amount of information in the market.
216.3 Results: Local liquidity
We now turn to the impact of fragmentation available at the regulated market, which we call
local liquidity. The estimates are reported in Table 4 and displayed in the lower panel of
Figure 5. Depth.10/ ￿rst slightly improves with fragmentation, where the maximum lies
at C10% at Frag D 0:17, but afterwards quickly reduces to ￿10% at Frag D 0:4. This
reduction is in line with the theory of Foucault and Menkveld (2008), where the execution
probability of the incumbent market diminishes as competing venues take away order ￿ow.
This side effect of competition makes the incumbent less attractive to liquidity providers,
resulting in lower depth. The coef￿cients on Dark are highly similar to those reported for
the global order book.
Consequently, small investors, who mainly care for Depth.10/ and are limited to trad-
ing on Euronext only, are worse off. This result is in contrast to the empirical results of
Weston (2002) for instance, who ￿nds that the liquidity on Nasdaq improves when ECNs
enter the market and compete for order ￿ow. The difference is probably due to the mar-
ket structure in the US, where Nasdaq market makers lost their oligopolistic rents after the
entry of ECNs.
We now turn to the regressions of the remaining liquidity measures in Table 4, columns
(6) to (10). In contrast to Depth.10/, these are not adversely affected by fragmentation.
It might be the case that Euronext is very liquid on some parts of the day, while relatively
illiquid during other parts. As the effective spread is based on trades, more liquid periods
with many trades receive a larger weight in the calculation. In addition, order splitting
behavior and smaller average order sizes may also generate lower average effective spreads.
Finally, the quoted spread on Euronext improves with fragmentation, while the quoted
depth reduces with 30% at Frag D 0:35. Given the reduction in Depth.10/, the gains of
improved prices are more than offset by the lower quantities offered.
7 Robustness checks
In this section we perform a series of robustness checks on the basic results. First, we
control for potential endogeneity issues by introducing ￿rm times quarter effects. These
control for the simultaneous interactions between market structure, the degree of fragmen-
tation, liquidity and competition in the market. In addition, this approach controls for a
22speci￿c reverse causality issue, where fragmentation tends to be higher for high volume
and more liquid stocks (Cantillon and Yin, 2010). To tackle remaining endogeneity prob-
lems of the fragmentation and dark trading variables we use an instrumental variables es-
timator. The instruments are (i) the number of MTF limit orders to market orders, (ii) the
logarithm of the average MTF order size and (iii) the logarithm of dark order size; and their
respective squares. We conclude by analyzing large and small ￿rms separately, along with
some additional robustness checks.
7.1 Regression analysis: ￿rm*time effects
In this section we perform the regressions of formula (2), but add ￿rm*quarter dummies.
Instead of a single dummy for a period of four years, we add 16 dummies per ￿rm. This is
similar to Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009), who analyze the effect of
algorithmic trading on volatility for currencies, and add separate quarter dummies for each
currency pair. This procedure is aimed to solve the following issues.
First, the ￿rm*quarter dummies make the analysis more robust to the impact of the
￿nancial crisis and industry speci￿c shocks. For example, if the ￿nancial crisis speci￿cally
affects certain ￿rms or industries (e.g., the ￿nancial sector), and affects both liquidity and
fragmentation, then the previous analysis might suffer from an omitted variables problem,
leading to a bias in the coef￿cients on fragmentation. The ￿rm*quarter dummies capture
industry shocks and time-varying ￿rm speci￿c shocks.
Second, the ￿rm*quarter dummies can control for potential self selection problems.
For example, Cantillon and Yin (2010) raise the issue that competition might be higher for
high volume and more liquid stocks; an effect that will be absorbed by the ￿rm*quarter
dummies as long as most variation in volume is at the quarterly level.
Third, the ￿rm*quarter dummies can, at least partially, control for dynamic interac-
tions between market structure, competition in the market, the degree of fragmentation
and liquidity. Speci￿cally, such interactions are dynamic as, for example, a change in the
current market structure will affect the level of competition in the future, which, in turn,
will affect the market structure and liquidity in the future. Our approach controls for the
long-term interactions of such forces by only allowing for variation in liquidity and frag-
mentation within a ￿rm-quarter. Accordingly, the dummy variables absorb the variation
between quarters, which is likely to be more prone to endogeneity issues.
23The results for global liquidity reveal a similar pattern as those presented in the base
regressions, as shown in panel A of Table 5 and displayed in the upper part of Figure 6.
For the sake of brevity, the table only reports the coef￿cients of Frag; Frag2 and Dark
for the depth measures, as these are the main focus of the paper. Results of the control
variables and other liquidity measures are in line with those reported in Tables 3 and 4, and
available upon request.
In the ￿rst regression, we observe that Depth.10/ monotonically increases with frag-
mentation, as the maximum of the curve lies beyond the highest observed value of frag-
mentation. There appears to be no harmful effect of fragmentation on liquidity close to
the midpoint. This is not the case for the other depth levels, as the maximum lies around
Frag D 0:40, implying a trade-off in the bene￿ts and drawbacks of fragmentation.
Two additional ￿ndings emerge from the ￿gure. First, at Frag D 0:40, the effect of
fragmentation on Depth.10/ improves to 0:28 and Depth.50/ to 0:10, compared with 0:50
and 0:40 in the base case regressions in Table 3. The effect of fragmentation on liquidity
is smaller but still highly signi￿cant. This is easily explained as the ￿rm*quarter dummies
absorb long-term trends in fragmentation, while only the day-to-day ￿uctuations remain.
From the regression results, it appears that removing the long-term variation dampens the
estimated daily effects. Second, liquidity deeper in the order book bene￿ts less from frag-
mentation than liquidity close to the midpoint does. This ￿nding was also con￿rmed in
Figure 5, but becomes more pronounced. The fact that Depth.10/ still improves strongly
with fragmentation suggests that competition of new trading venues mainly takes place at
liquidity close to the midpoint. The coef￿cients on Dark show a similar pattern as those
reported in Table 3, but are about 15% lower in magnitude. That is, the detrimental effect
of dark activity on visible liquidity remains.
The impact of fragmentation on local liquidity, including ￿rm*quarter effects, is shown
in panel B of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 6. The ￿gure shows that the results for
the local order book have become more negative, as all depth measures reduce by 8% at
Frag D 0:40. In the base speci￿cation, this reduction of liquidity was only observed for
Depth.10/.
247.2 An instrumental variables approach
In the instrumental variables regressions we aim to solve for more general reverse causality
issues offragmentation anddark trading. For example, Frag might behigh becausea stock
is very liquid on a particular day; or Dark might be high when an investor substitutes the
visible market for dark trading because the visible market is illiquid. In such cases Frag
and Dark dependonliquidity, causingustomakeincorrectinterpretationsoftheregression
coef￿cients.
We employ an instrumental variables speci￿cation to alleviate these problems. We
instrument Frag, Frag2 and Dark with (i) the number of MTF electronic messages to
transactions,24 (ii) the logarithm of the average MTF order size and (iii) the logarithm of
the average Dark order size, on day t for stock i. In addition, we add the squares of the
instruments to capture non linear effects and to check the validity of the instruments with
overidentifying restrictions tests. We also add ￿rm*quarter dummies, and use the two stage
GMM estimator which is ef￿cient in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Stock and Yogo,
2002).
The ￿rst instrument, the ratio of MTF messages to transactions, is negatively related
to fragmentation. After the startup of a new venue, typically the number of transactions is
very low, while the available liquidity can already be substantial. As the venues liquidity
reaches critical mass, the number of transactions will increase sharply, lowering the ratio
and boosting fragmentation. At ￿rst glance the instrument might not seem exogenous be-
cause typically both the number of electronic messages and transactions are associated to
better liquidity. However, using the ratio neutralizes the combined effect, as the exogeneity
of the instrument is con￿rmed by the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions. The
secondinstrument, thelogarithmoftheMTFsordersize, positivelyrelatestofragmentation
as larger MTF orders typically lead to more MTF volume and market share.25 We argue
that the instrument is exogenous, as it is not obvious how the MTF order size would relate
to liquidity except via fragmentation, after controlling for total traded volume and the other
regressors. The third instrument, the logarithm of dark order size, positively affects dark
activity. In a similar fashion to the previous instrument, larger dark orders lead to more
dark volume and market share.
24MTF electronic messages are to the number of placed and canceled limit orders, aggregated over the
MTFs Bats Europe, Chi-X, Nasdaq OMX and Turquoise.
25O’Hara and Ye (2011) also use the logarithm of average order size as an excluded instrument in their
Heckman correction model.
25Unreported ￿rst stage estimations reveal that all instruments are statistically and eco-
nomically signi￿cant. Especially the ratio of MTF messages to transactions and the loga-
rithmoftheaverageMTFordersizeareparticularlyusefulinstrumentsfor Frag, withstan-
dardized coef￿cients of -0.15 and 0.23, respectively. The logarithm of the average Dark
order size is a very strong instrument for Dark, with a standardized coef￿cient of 0.4. The
six instruments can strongly predict fragmentation and dark activity as the Kleibergen-Paap
and Angrist-Pischke Wald tests for weak and under identi￿cation are strongly rejected in
all regressions, reported in the bottom part of Table 5. Unreported tests also reject the
redundancy of all individual instruments.
The second stage IV regression results are reported in panel C and D of Table 5 and
displayed in Figure 7. First, we observe that the magnitudes of the coef￿cients on frag-
mentation have strongly increased and are highly signi￿cant. At Frag D 0:4, global
Depth.10/ and Depth.50/ improve with 55% and 23% compared with a completely con-
centrated market. The standard errors have strongly increased, as the IV procedure reduces
the accuracy with which the coef￿cients are estimated. Importantly, Figure 7 shows that the
optimal level of fragmentation is similar to previous speci￿cations, and we con￿rm again
that Depth.10/ bene￿ts most from fragmentation. The coef￿cients on Dark have slightly
increased compared with those reported in panel A and B and are still highly signi￿cant.
Assuming exogenous instruments, the initial estimates did not suffer from endogeneity is-
sues.
Turning to the IV results for local liquidity, panel D and the lower panel in Figure
7, we observe the following. First, due to increased standard errors, only the coef￿cients
of Depth.10/ and Depth.50/ are signi￿cantly different from zero. The standard errors
have increased because the instruments need to generate variation in Frag and Frag2;
which are very collinear. Accordingly, the plots do not reveal a clear trend and we cannot
con￿rm previous results. In contrast, the coef￿cients on Dark are again highly signi￿cant
and negative, similar to previous ￿ndings.
Finally, wetesttherequirementthatthesetofinstrumentsneedstobeuncorrelatedwith
the error term "it (exogeneity of the instruments). The exogeneity of the instruments is vali-
dated in eight out of ten regressions, as the Hansen J test does not reject the overidentifying
restrictions. Only for global Depth.40/ and Depth.50/ the overidentifying restrictions are
rejected, questioning the exogeneity of the instruments. A GMM distance test reveals that
the logarithm of the MTF order size causes this rejection. In unreported regressions, using
26subsets of the instruments or treating Dark as exogenous does not affect the main results.
However, we prefer the current setup, as it allows us to perform overidentifying restrictions
tests.
7.3 Small versus large stocks
The bene￿ts and drawbacks of competition on liquidity might hinge on certain stock char-
acteristics, such as ￿rm size. We pursue the point in question by executing the base speci￿-
cation regressions for large stocks, with an average market cap exceeding ten billion Euro,
and small stocks, with an average market cap below 100 million Euro. The results for the
global and local order books of 15 large and 14 small sample stocks are reported in Table
6, panel A to D. The coef￿cients for the global order book are plotted in Figure 8, and
show two interesting results. First, the bene￿ts of competition are higher for large stocks
than for small stocks. For large ￿rms, the Depth.10/ is 64% higher at Frag D 0:35,
while for small ￿rms the maximum, at Frag D 0:18; has 30% more liquidity compared
with a completely concentrated market. Second, the ￿gure shows that the bene￿t of com-
petition for large stocks is monotonically positive, meaning there are no harmful effects of
fragmentation. By contrast, the liquidity of small stocks is negatively affected for levels
of fragmentation exceeding 0:36. This suggests that the bene￿ts of fragmentation strongly
depend on ￿rm size. The harmful effect of Dark activity on liquidity is similar for small
and large stocks.
Turning to the regressions in panel C and D of Table 6, we ￿nd that the local liquidity
of large stocks also increases with fragmentation, while that of small stocks strongly de-
creases. That is, at Frag D 0:35, Depth.10/ of large stocks improves by 12%, while that
of small stocks reduces with 38%. Again, this con￿rms that the drawbacks of a fragmented
market place mainly hold for relatively small stocks. The fact that large stocks bene￿t
more from fragmentation is in line with their actual levels of fragmentation, which is 0:41
in 2009, while for small stocks only 0:21.
7.4 Additional robustness checks
To investigate the sensitivity of our results, we perform a number of robustness checks.
First, we execute the regressions with ￿rm*quarter dummies, but only use observations
27from2008and2009. Theresultsdonotchange(notreported), likelybecausefragmentation
especially took place in 2008 and 2009. This provides an additional robustness to potential
time effects (e.g. the ￿nancial crisis), as the coef￿cients on fragmentation are estimated
within a smaller time window. In addition, this covers for the fact that our dataset contains
the ten best price levels on Euronext Amsterdam as of January 2008, while before only the
best ￿ve price levels (as mentioned in footnote 14). Finally, this solves the potential issue
that the data by Markit Boat on dark trades is available only as of November 2007.
Second, we execute the regressions in ￿rst differences, i.e. use the daily changes in-
stead of the daily levels. By analyzing the day-to-day changes, we remove the long-term
trends in the data. The results are very similar to those using ￿rm*quarter dummies (not
reported).
Third, instead of using Frag to measure fragmentation, we use the market share of
the traditional market (Euronext Amsterdam), and the qualitative results do not change.
Finally, we have plotted higher order polynomials of Frag, and the inverted U-shapes
remain, indicating that the ￿nding on an optimal level of fragmentation is robust.
8 Conclusion
Changes in ￿nancial regulation (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) imple-
mented in November 2007 allow for the proliferation of new trading platforms in European
equity markets. Currently, many stocks are traded on a variety of trading venues and the
market has become fragmented. In addition, the regulation allows for a large fraction of
trading to take place on dark venues, such as broker-dealer crossing networks, dark pools
and Over The Counter.
We ￿nd that fragmentation on visible exchanges improves liquidity, while dark trading
harms liquidity. As such, we provide a re￿nement to the current view that market frag-
mentation improves liquidity. In general, our results imply that the type of trading venue
determines the overall effect of competition between stock exchanges. We analyze a set
of large Dutch stocks, which are representative for the European arena in terms of degree
of fragmentation and dark activity. Next to separating visible from dark fragmentation, we
explicitly differentiate between global and local liquidity, where global liquidity takes all
relevant trading venues into account while local liquidity only the traditional stock market.
28The main result is that the effect of fragmentation on global liquidity shows an in-
verted U-shape, while the effect of dark trading is strongly negative. Maximum liquidity
is obtained when the degree of fragmentation is slightly above the average level in 2009.
Then, global liquidity improves by approximately 35% compared with the case of a fully
concentrated market, while an increase in dark trading of one standard deviation lowers
liquidity by 9%. The negative coef￿cient on dark trading could be explained by a ￿cream-
skimming￿ effect, where the dark markets mostly attract uninformed order ￿ow which in
turn increases adverse selection costs on the visible markets. Interestingly, while global liq-
uidity generally improves in fragmentation, local liquidity does not. That is, the competing
trading platforms take away liquidity, such that an investor who only has access to the tradi-
tional market is worse off. The reduction in liquidity close to the midpoint, i.e. at relatively
good prices, can be more than 10% compared to the case of no fragmentation. As addi-
tional results, we ￿nd that competition between trading venues is ￿ercer for larger stocks,
as these are more fragmented and have a higher marginal bene￿t of fragmentation. Also,
large stocks do not face the drawbacks of fragmentation like small stocks do. This suggests
that the bene￿ts and drawbacks of fragmentation depend on certain stock characteristics,
size in particular.
Our results add to the policy discussion on competition in ￿nancial markets, and sug-
gest that the effect of on market quality strongly depends on the type of trading venues.
While overall market quality has improved, investors without access to all visible and dark
markets are worse off. We argue that the improvement of liquidity is due to competition
between trading venues and suppliers and demanders of liquidity.
The current analysis does not incorporate iceberg orders and the liquidity at dark pools.
This could lead to inaccuracies of the results, and as such, we want to be careful in inter-
preting the effect of dark trading on global liquidity. That said, the negative effect of dark
activity supports the notion that traders without access to these venues are worse off. A
second issue is that the consolidated order book does not take trading charges and other
fees such as clearing and settlement into account, which might make it too expensive to
trade simultaneously on several markets or to split up orders across venues. A potential
avenue for future research is to incorporate these explicit transaction costs in the analysis,
which would represent the true cost of trading to an investor.
299 Appendix: liquidity measures
The liquidity measures other than Depth.X/ are explained in this section. We calculate
the price impact and the effective and realized spreads based on trades and weighted over
all trades per day. In contrast, Depth.X/, quoted spread and quoted depth are liquidity
measuresbasedonquotesofferedinthelimitorderbookandtimeweightedoverthetrading
day. The effective spread measures direct execution costs while the realized spread takes
the order’s price impact into account. The realized spread is often considered to be the
compensation for the liquidity supplier. Denote MQo as the quoted midpoint before an
order takes place and MQoC5 the quoted midpoint, but ￿ve minutes later and D D [1;￿1]
for a buy and a sell order respectively, then
Ef f ectivehalf spread D
Price ￿ MQo
MQo
￿ D ￿ 10:000; (3)
Realized half spread D
Price ￿ MQoC5
MQo




￿ D ￿ 10:000: (5)
The price impact, realized and effective spread are ￿rst calculated per trade, based on the
midpoint of that trading venue. Then, all calculations are averaged over the trading day,
weighted by traded volume. Next, we average over trading venues, again weighted by trad-
ing venue. This approach gives the average spread in the whole market. Limited computer
power is the reason we use the midpoint of the trading venue where the trade took place
instead of the consolidated midpoint. That is, creating a consolidated midpoint quote-by-
qoute, as is required for the effective and realized spreads, is computationally much more
burdensome than creating a consolidated order book using one-minute snapshots.26 The
price impact and realized spread are calculated between 09.00 - 16.25, while the effective
spread on 9.00 - 16.30. Therefore, Ef f ective spread ￿ Realized spread C Price
impact. The global quoted spread is based on the best price in the consolidated order book
(based on the one-minute snapshot data, see Section 5.1) and expressed in basis points,
while the local quoted spread is based on the order book of Euronext. In a similar fashion,
26Our dataset also has a consolidated tape constructed by Thomson Reuters, containing best prices, quan-
tities and all visible trades in the market. However, extensive checking shows that the time stamp of these
trades may differ up to three seconds from the time stamp of the same trades in the original ￿le.
30the quoted depth aggregates the number of shares times their prices, expressed in Euros, or
Quoted spread D
P ASK ￿ PBI D
Midpoint
￿ 10:000; (6)
Quoted depth D P ASK ￿ QASK C PBI D ￿ PBI D: (7)
Note that the quoted depth on Euronext can be larger than that of the consolidated order
book, for example when Chi-X offers a better price but with a lower quantity. The quoted
spread of the consolidated order book is always equal or better than that of Euronext. Fi-
nally, the quoted depth is identical to Depth.10/ when the quoted spread equals 20 basis
points.
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35Table (1) Descriptive statistics: time series.
The table shows the medians of the liquidity measures on a yearly basis for the global and
local order book (Panel A), and additional descriptive statistics of the sample stocks (Panel
B). The medians are based on 52 ￿rms and 250 trading days per year (11.250 observations).
Depth.X/isexpressedine1000sandrepresentstheofferedliquiditywithin X basispoints
around the midpoint. The realized spread, price impact and effective and quoted spread are
measured in basis points. The price impact and realized spread are based on a 5 minute time
window. The quoted depth is the amount of shares, in e1000s, offered at the best bid and
ask price of the global and local order book. The descriptives show the natural logarithm of
￿rm size, traded volume, realized return volatility and algorithmic trading. Return volatility
is de￿ned as the daily standard deviation of 15 minute returns on the midpoint. Typically,
this standard deviation is lower than one, so the natural logarithm becomes negative. Algo
represents the number of electronic messages in the market divided by total traded volume
(per e10.000). An electronic message occurs when a limit order in the order book is
executed, changed or canceled.
Panel A: Liquidity measures
Global Local
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Depth(10) 102 134 50 66 101 127 39 36
Depth(20) 263 299 125 187 261 279 94 93
Depth(30) 367 404 183 291 359 366 141 155
Depth(40) 441 463 228 367 422 406 178 206
Depth(50) 488 505 258 420 463 426 205 244
Realized 2.5 1.1 -0.1 0.0 2.4 1.1 -0.2 0.1
Price Impact 10.4 9.4 14.3 13.3 10.4 9.5 14.2 13.5
Effective 14.1 11.2 15.1 13.2 13.8 11.1 14.5 13.1
Quoted Spread 13.3 10.9 14.5 12.0 13.5 11.5 16.8 14.7
Quoted Depth 101 82 41 32 102 85 40 30
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
2006 2007 2008 2009
Ln Size 14.7 15.0 14.7 14.4
Ln Volume 16.7 17.1 17.0 16.5
Algo 1.9 2.6 6.6 28.4
Ln SD -6.2 -6.1 -5.5 -5.6
36Table (2) Descriptive statistics of fragmentation and dark trading.
The yearly standard deviation, mean and quartiles of fragmentation and dark trading are
reported. Fragmentation is de￿ned as 1￿HHI, where HHI is based on the market shares
of visible trading venues. Dark share is the percentage of traded volume executed at dark
pools, SIs and Over The Counter, available only as of November 2007. The statistics are
based on daily observations per ￿rm. That is, every observation is equally weighted as
opposed to weighing according to traded volume, in which case the mean dark share is
approximately 37%.
Year Stdev Mean 25th 50th 75th
Fragmentation
2006 0.081 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.010
2007 0.066 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.017
2008 0.119 0.097 0.000 0.044 0.168
2009 0.153 0.275 0.143 0.291 0.403
Total 0.150 0.106 0.000 0.015 0.182
Dark share
2008 0.173 0.255 0.134 0.225 0.331
2009 0.169 0.250 0.131 0.221 0.327
37Table (3) The effect of fragmentation on global liquidity.
The dependent variable in models (1) - (5) is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure based on the consolidated order book. The Depth(X) is expressed
in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. The effective spread, realized spread, price impact and
quoted spread, (6) - (9), are measured in basis points. Ln quoted depth is the logarithm of the quoted depth in Euros (10). Frag is the degree of market
fragmentation, de￿ned as 1 ￿ HHI. Dark is the percentage of order ￿ow executed OTC, on crossing networks, dark pools and SIs. Algo represents
the number of electronic messages divided by traded volume in the market (per e100); the other variables are explained in the descriptive statistics
and Table 7. The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for 52 stocks, and have ￿rm ￿xed effects and quarter dummies. T-stats are shown below
the coef￿cients, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels, respectively.





















Frag 2.844*** 2.080*** 2.188*** 2.334*** 2.420*** -31.32*** 1.047 -32.40*** -41.94*** -0.888***
(15.9) (21.0) (26.4) (28.5) (29.7) (-16.0) (0.5) (-17.2) (-24.8) (-11.6)
Frag2 -4.069*** -2.875*** -3.081*** -3.381*** -3.616*** 33.94*** -6.615** 40.61*** 55.72*** 0.305**
(-13.4) (-15.7) (-19.2) (-21.1) (-22.7) (9.8) (-2.0) (12.8) (19.0) (2.0)
Dark -0.914*** -0.685*** -0.587*** -0.540*** -0.503*** 2.960*** -1.147 4.101*** 4.476*** -0.544***
(-20.2) (-23.7) (-24.0) (-22.9) (-21.8) (3.7) (-1.4) (7.8) (9.8) (-26.8)
Ln Size 1.008*** 0.623*** 0.491*** 0.427*** 0.387*** -6.996*** -3.220*** -3.779*** -4.906*** 0.279***
(24.2) (24.8) (24.6) (22.5) (20.9) (-15.8) (-7.6) (-8.6) (-9.4) (17.7)
Ln Price -0.012 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.067*** -0.137 -0.207 0.0728 1.759*** -0.056***
(-0.5) (3.8) (4.7) (4.8) (4.5) (-0.4) (-0.7) (0.3) (4.3) (-4.2)
Ln Vol 0.576*** 0.429*** 0.385*** 0.353*** 0.327*** -2.304*** 0.380** -2.682*** -3.724*** 0.233***
(40.9) (45.7) (47.0) (47.4) (46.9) (-11.3) (2.0) (-17.0) (-29.4) (43.2)
Ln SD -0.619*** -0.537*** -0.466*** -0.420*** -0.384*** 7.312*** -4.963*** 12.28*** 5.733*** -0.223***
(-40.0) (-52.2) (-54.0) (-52.5) (-50.7) (31.9) (-23.6) (53.0) (33.5) (-33.7)
Algo -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 4.565*** 0.034 4.527*** 4.514*** -0.007
(-5.4) (-7.1) (-7.6) (-8.4) (-8.8) (14.6) (0.1) (13.7) (15.5) (-0.8)
Obs 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879
R2 0.461 0.663 0.681 0.659 0.641 0.236 0.042 0.331 0.352 0.673
3
8Table (4) The effect of fragmentation on local liquidity.
The dependent variable in models (1) - (5) is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure based on the order book of Euronext Amsterdam. The Depth(X)
is expressed in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. The effective spread, realized spread, price
impact and quoted spread, (6) - (9), are measured in basis points. Ln quoted depth is the logarithm of the quoted depth in Euros (10). Frag is the
degree of market fragmentation, de￿ned as 1 ￿ HHI. Dark is the percentage of order ￿ow executed OTC, on crossing networks, dark pools and
SIs. Algo represents the number of electronic messages divided by traded volume in the market (per e100); the other variables are explained in the
descriptive statistics and Table 7. The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for 52 stocks, and have ￿rm ￿xed effects and quarter dummies.
T-stats are shown below the coef￿cients, calculated using robust Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote
signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.





















Frag 1.025*** 0.006 0.162* 0.411*** 0.589*** -31.07*** 0.679 -31.79*** -35.21*** -0.416***
(5.7) (0.1) (1.8) (4.5) (6.4) (-14.7) (0.3) (-17.7) (-18.3) (-5.8)
Frag2 -2.942*** -0.427** -0.294 -0.624*** -0.960*** 36.40*** -6.349* 42.82*** 48.65*** -1.248***
(-9.6) (-2.2) (-1.6) (-3.3) (-5.0) (9.9) (-1.7) (14.2) (17.0) (-9.1)
Dark -0.947*** -0.722*** -0.647*** -0.621*** -0.596*** 2.348*** -1.784** 4.127*** 4.043*** -0.541***
(-20.8) (-23.5) (-23.3) (-22.3) (-21.6) (2.9) (-2.1) (8.0) (8.3) (-27.5)
Ln Size 0.958*** 0.542*** 0.407*** 0.344*** 0.307*** -7.414*** -3.364*** -4.054*** -4.471** 0.224***
(22.5) (20.6) (18.9) (16.1) (14.5) (-16.5) (-7.7) (-9.3) (-2.6) (14.0)
Ln Price -0.052** 0.044** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.069 -0.163 0.236 1.894*** -0.049***
(-2.1) (2.6) (3.7) (3.6) (3.2) (0.2) (-0.5) (0.8) (4.7) (-3.5)
Ln Vol 0.578*** 0.426*** 0.382*** 0.351*** 0.326*** -2.081*** 0.598*** -2.676*** -4.066*** 0.244***
(40.1) (43.1) (43.1) (42.6) (41.7) (-9.4) (2.9) (-17.4) (-6.6) (45.4)
Ln SD -0.609*** -0.534*** -0.469*** -0.425*** -0.391*** 7.312*** -5.057*** 12.37*** 8.337*** -0.223***
(-38.4) (-48.0) (-47.7) (-45.3) (-43.2) (30.8) (-22.9) (53.6) (6.5) (-34.4)
Algo -0.128*** -0.187*** -0.206*** -0.216*** -0.214*** 3.869*** 0.108 3.756*** 6.01*** 0.056***
(-5.9) (-13.0) (-16.2) (-17.4) (-17.5) (12.4) (0.4) (11.9) (18.4) (6.7)
Obs 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46879 46858 46858
R2 0.498 0.677 0.671 0.636 0.607 0.208 0.039 0.335 0.121 0.717
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9Table (5) The effect of fragmentation on liquidity: ￿rm*quarter ￿xed effects and IV.
Panel A and B show the regression results for global and local depth respectively, where ￿rm*quarter dummies are added. Panel C and D show the
IV results, where Frag, Frag2 and Dark are instrumented by (i) the number of MTF limit orders to market orders, (ii) the logarithm of the average
MTF order size, (iii) the logarithm of the average Dark order size; and their respective squares, resulting in six instruments. The IV regressions also
include ￿rm*quarter dummies. The Hansen J statistic tests the overidentifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid
(exogenous). The p-value of this statistic is reported below. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure based on the global and
local order book. The Depth(X) is expressed in Euros and represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. Frag is the
degree of market fragmentation, de￿ned as 1 - HHI. Dark is the percentage of order ￿ow executed OTC, on dark pools and SIs. The control variables
(not reported) are Ln size, Ln price, Ln volume, Ln volatility and algo, as explained in Table 7. The regressions are based on 1022 trading days for
52 stocks. T-stats are shown below the coef￿cients, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote
signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.





















Panel A: Global, Firm*Quarter dummies Panel B: Local, Firm*Quarter dummies
Frag 0.984*** 0.756*** 0.700*** 0.659*** 0.593*** 0.259* -0.0250 -0.0542 -0.0538 -0.0617
(6.4) (9.7) (10.6) (10.7) (10.2) (1.8) (-0.4) (-0.9) (-0.9) (-1.1)
Frag2 -0.749*** -0.697*** -0.872*** -0.927*** -0.877*** -1.049*** -0.419*** -0.413*** -0.428*** -0.409***
(-2.8) (-4.7) (-7.0) (-7.9) (-7.8) (-4.1) (-3.1) (-3.4) (-3.7) (-3.6)
Dark -0.750*** -0.532*** -0.480*** -0.443*** -0.417*** -0.723*** -0.535*** -0.491*** -0.458*** -0.430***
(-20.2) (-21.4) (-26.5) (-27.1) (-26.8) (-19.6) (-21.5) (-26.3) (-26.7) (-26.2)
Panel C: Global, IV Panel D: Local, IV
Frag 8.146*** 5.300*** 3.933*** 3.287*** 2.773*** 2.877** 0.653 -0.125 -0.255 -0.492
(6.1) (8.4) (9.0) (8.3) (7.6) (2.2) (1.1) (-0.3) (-0.7) (-1.4)
Frag2 -17.63*** -11.27*** -8.164*** -6.844*** -5.668*** -7.307** -1.659 0.545 0.850 1.491
(-5.1) (-6.7) (-7.2) (-6.7) (-6.1) (-2.1) (-1.0) (0.5) (0.8) (1.6)
Dark -0.836*** -0.600*** -0.531*** -0.496*** -0.463*** -0.798*** -0.600*** -0.538*** -0.502*** -0.470***
(-12.5) (-14.2) (-15.2) (-15.4) (-15.1) (-12.6) (-14.7) (-15.0) (-14.8) (-14.2)
Hansen J 2.451 4.094 8.173 17.16 25.66 7.506 7.218 3.019 0.907 2.217
Hansen p 0.484 0.252 0.0426 0.000656 1.13e-05 0.0574 0.0653 0.389 0.824 0.529
First stage results:
Kleibergen-Paap weak ID F stat: 108. Angrist-Pischke weak ID F stat: 48 (Frag), 36 (Frag2), 855 (Dark).
4
0Table (6) The effect of fragmentation on liquidity: large and small ￿rms.
The base speci￿cation regressions are executed separately for the 15 smallest stocks (average market cap < 100 million) and the 14 largest stocks (average market
cap > 10 billion); for the global and local order books. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the Depth(X) measure. The Depth(X) is expressed in Euros and
represents the offered liquidity within (X) basis points around the midpoint. Frag is the degree of market fragmentation, de￿ned as 1 ￿ HHI. For the sake of
brevity, the coef￿cients on the control variables are not reported, as they are very similar to those of Tables 3 and 4. The control variables are Ln size, Ln price, Ln
volume, Ln volatility and algo, as explained in Table 7. The regressions contain ￿rm ￿xed effects and quarter dummies. T-stats are shown below the coef￿cients
and calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.





















Panel A: Global, large ￿rms Panel B: Local, large ￿rms
Frag 1.458*** 1.150*** 1.072*** 1.052*** 1.058*** 0.640*** 0.478*** 0.355** 0.352** 0.393**
(10.1) (9.1) (8.1) (7.4) (7.1) (5.1) (3.9) (2.6) (2.3) (2.4)
Frag2 -0.555* -0.463* -0.334 -0.374 -0.438 -0.869*** -0.484* 0.0768 0.194 0.141
(-2.0) (-1.8) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-1.4) (-3.5) (-1.9) (0.3) (0.6) (0.4)
Dark -0.833*** -0.598*** -0.497*** -0.461*** -0.443*** -0.813*** -0.671*** -0.579*** -0.540*** -0.520***
(-23.0) (-17.3) (-13.8) (-12.0) (-11.3) (-21.3) (-16.6) (-13.1) (-11.4) (-10.7)
Panel C: Global, small ￿rms Panel B: Local, small ￿rms
Frag 2.992*** 2.086*** 1.805*** 1.649*** 1.443*** 1.330** 0.380 0.173 0.139 0.0487
-4.9 -6.8 -7.4 -7.5 -6.9 (2.1) (1.2) (0.6) (0.5) (0.2)
Frag2 -8.300*** -5.373*** -4.706*** -4.290*** -3.825*** -6.230*** -3.045*** -2.406*** -2.144*** -1.844***
(-6.9) (-8.4) (-8.9) (-9.1) (-8.7) (-5.0) (-4.5) (-4.0) (-3.7) (-3.2)
Dark -1.180*** -0.714*** -0.687*** -0.639*** -0.613*** -1.205*** -0.765*** -0.757*** -0.729*** -0.711***












































Figure (1) Traded Volume in millions of Euros.
The ￿gure displays monthly averages of the daily traded volume in millions, aggregated over the 52
AEX Large and Mid cap constituents. Euronext consists of Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Lisbon.
GermanycombinesalltheGermancitieswhileOtherrepresentsBatsEurope, NasdaqOMXEurope,
Virt-x and Turquoise combined. Finally, Off exchange represents the order￿ow executed Over The
Counter, at Systematic Internalisers, crossing networks and dark pools; however, these numbers are
not available prior to November 2007.
42Figure (2) Snapshot of a hypothetical limit order book.
Depth(20)aggregatesliquidityofferedwithintheintervalof(M-20bps, M+20bps), which
are 2500 shares on the ask side and 800 on the bid side. Depth(40) contains 4100 and 2800
























10 20 30 40 50 60

















10 20 30 40 50 60
Basis points around midpoint, X
Depth(10) Depth(50)
Depth(90)
Figure (3) Depth in the consolidated order book.
The upper panel shows the median of the Depth(X) measure, expressed in e1000s. The
measure aggregates the Euro value of the shares offered within a ￿xed amount of basis
points X around the midpoint, shown on the horizontal axes. The consolidated order book
represents liquidity to a global investor, where the order books of Euronext Amsterdam,
Deutsche Boerse, Chi-X, Virt-X, Turquoise, Nasdaq OMX Europe and Bats Europe are
aggregated. The median is based on the 52 AEX large and mid cap constituents between































Figure (4) Fragmentation of AEX large and Mid cap ￿rms.
The monthly 10, 50 and 90th percentiles of Frag are shown, for the 52 AEX large and mid
cap stocks between 2006 - 2009. Frag equals 1 - HHI, based on the number of shares
traded at the following trading venues: Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Lisbon
together), Deutsche Boerse, Chi-X, Virt-X, Turquoise, Nasdaq OMX Europe and Bats Eu-
rope. Trades executed OTC, on crossing networks, SIs or dark pools are not taken into






























Figure (5) The effect of fragmentation on global and local liquidity.
The regression coef￿cients of fragmentation on liquidity are plotted, for the global order
book (upper panel, model (1) - (5) of Table 3) and local order book (lower panel, model
(1) - (5) of Table 4). The vertical axis displays the logarithm of the depth(X), while the




































Figure (6) Fragmentation and liquidity: ￿rm*quarter dummies.
The regression coef￿cients of fragmentation on liquidity of Table 5 are plotted, where the
regressions have ￿rm*quarter dummies. The upper panel shows the global order book
and the lower panel the local order book. The vertical axis displays the logarithm of the





































Figure (7) Fragmentation and liquidity: IV regressions.
The IV regression coef￿cients of fragmentation on liquidity of Table 5 are plotted. The in-
struments are (i) the number of MTF electronic messages to transactions, (ii) the logarithm
of the average MTF order size and (iii) the logarithm of the average Dark order size; and
their respective squares. The regressions include ￿rm*quarter dummies. The vertical axis
displays the logarithm of the depth(X), while the horizontal axis shows the level of visible
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Figure (8) Fragmentation and global liquidity: small versus large stocks.
The regression coef￿cients of fragmentation on liquidity are plotted, for large and small
stocks (regressions (1) - (5) in panel A and B, Table 6). The 14 large stocks have an average
market cap exceeding ten billion Euro, while the 15 small caps Large stocks consist of the
14 stocks with an average market cap exceeding ten billion Euro, while the 15 small stocks
have a market cap smaller than 100 million Euro. The regressions include ￿rm*quarter
dummies. The vertical axis displays the logarithm of the depth(X), while the horizontal
axis shows the level of visible fragmentation, de￿ned as (1 - HHI).
49Table (7) Appendix Tables
Descriptive statistics of sample ￿rms: cross section
The dataset covers daily observations for 52 AEX large and mid cap constituents, from 2006 to 2009. All
variables in the table are averages. Firm size and traded volume are expressed in millions of Euros. Return
volatility re￿ects the daily standard deviation of 15 minute returns on the midpoint and is multiplied by 100.
Euronext represents the market share of executed trades on Euronext Amsterdam. Off exchange is the market
share of Over The Counter trades, Systematic Internalisers and dark pools; this number is available as of
November 2007.
Firm Size Price Volume Return Vol Off Exchange Euronext
Aalberts 1:3 29:01 7:4 0:39 7:95 89:98
Adv. Metal. Group 0:6 21:22 8:6 0:78 17:94 78:89
Aegon 16:6 10:25 161:0 0:46 15:21 76:92
Ahold 11:4 8:52 120:0 0:28 18:61 74:93
Air France 5:6 19:94 63:9 0:40 15:06 78:04
Akzo nobel 12:3 44:93 147:0 0:30 19:59 73:42
Arcadis 0:9 31:39 3:3 0:41 10:78 87:51
Arcellor Mittal 3:3 35:68 388:0 0:50 24:17 70:14
Asm Int. 0:8 14:47 7:0 0:44 10:23 86:31
ASML 8:1 17:78 144:0 0:39 16:75 75:52
Bamn Group 1:7 18:83 14:8 0:41 11:81 83:46
Binckbank 0:6 10:60 4:2 0:36 10:53 88:51
Boskalis 2:2 39:49 13:5 0:42 12:73 83:65
Corio 3:5 51:12 26:9 0:36 14:99 79:03
Crucell 1:0 15:49 9:2 0:36 8:49 89:80
CSMN 1:5 20:92 8:0 0:29 11:99 86:03
Draka Hold. 0:5 13:01 3:6 0:55 16:18 77:54
DSM 6:1 32:02 73:0 0:29 16:89 76:86
Eurocomm. Prop 1:2 32:47 5:8 0:37 11:14 86:99
Fortis 34:5 22:83 437:0 0:38 13:37 83:51
Fugro 2:8 38:99 25:0 0:34 10:30 84:83
Hagemeyer 2:0 3:76 43:4 0:31 0:00 99:28
Heijmans 0:6 25:07 3:8 0:40 8:30 90:56
Heineken 16:7 34:06 100:0 0:28 18:86 74:15
Imtech 1:2 15:04 9:2 0:40 18:02 77:45
ING 50:0 22:75 904:0 0:44 14:23 81:24
Nutreco 1:5 42:41 15:1 0:28 12:35 85:27
Oce 0:9 9:94 8:5 0:40 10:54 86:81
Ordina 0:4 10:95 2:8 0:41 7:30 89:97
Philips 28:4 25:00 301:0 0:32 21:05 71:25
R. Dutch Shell 88:5 24:22 529:0 0:27 21:57 69:54
R. KPN 20:4 10:93 220:0 0:26 23:25 69:79
R. ten cate 0:5 26:68 2:3 0:40 10:11 87:63
R. Wessanen 0:6 8:48 4:3 0:32 9:10 87:49
Randstad 4:5 35:17 38:3 0:39 14:21 79:11
Reed Elsevier 8:1 11:31 74:1 0:27 20:51 71:97
SBM Offshore 2:8 26:38 35:6 0:36 13:18 80:12
Smit Int. 10:7 48:09 4:6 0:38 15:30 80:02
Sns Reaal 2:9 11:65 11:5 0:42 12:94 85:50
Tele Atlas 1:8 20:06 37:0 0:33 8:24 68:20
Tnt 10:7 24:95 99:3 0:33 19:65 73:59
Tomtom 3:0 25:32 47:7 0:54 10:44 83:14
Unibail Rodamco 11:9 143:64 172:0 0:36 34:67 57:59
Unilever 32:2 23:62 327:0 0:26 17:58 73:85
Usg People 0:6 9:27 8:5 0:71 19:01 68:01
Vastned 1:0 55:99 5:0 0:32 10:50 87:41
Vdr Moolen 0:2 4:74 2:2 0:35 2:12 97:45
Vedior 2:9 16:70 67:7 0:27 2:99 96:48
Vopak Int. 2:3 36:52 8:9 0:30 12:24 84:75
Wavin 0:7 7:94 5:8 0:49 11:83 86:88
Wereldhave 1:6 78:77 16:0 0:28 13:56 81:87
Wolters Kluwers 5:5 18:10 42:1 0:30 13:15 78:09
50